HISTORY

MARATHA RULE

Shahu, 1707-1749.

AURANGZEB DIED IN 1707. By the advice of Zulfikar Khan Aurangzeb's second son, prince Azam Shah, determined to release Shahu and promised that if he succeeded in establishing his authority and continued steadfast in his allegiance he should receive the tract conquered from Bijapur by his grandfather Shivaji with an additional territory between Bhima and Godavari [Grant Duff's Marathas, 314. ]. On Shahu's approach Tarabai, unwilling to lose the power she had so long held, pretended to believe him an impostor and determined to oppose him. The first encounter between Shahu and Tarabai's forces under Dhanaji Jadhav and Parashurampant Pratinidhi took place at Khed where Shahu got an easy victory on 12th October 1707, because Dhanaji feeling that Shahu's cause was just, did not fight and the Pratinidhi finding himself single-handed withdrew from the field and fled to Satara. Shahu proceeded towards Shirval which guarded the way towards Rohida fort. Tarabai had assigned to Shankaraji Narayan Sachiv, the work of guarding the western hilly region round about. He was one of those who had expressed his loyalty towards Tarabai by taking an oath on boiled rice and milk (Malbar Ramrao Chitnis: Thorale Shahu Maharaj p. 14). Shahu invited Shankaraji to see him for a talk, but he would not go. Shahu then himself decided to see him. Shankaraji made all possible efforts to avoid him but finding his position rather critical, and himself divided between the conflict of loyalties, he suddenly put an end to his life [Grant Duff says that he performed Jal Samadhi or water death, a form to which Hindu devotees were partial. The victim seated himself on a wooden platform supported in deep water by earthen pots with their mouths turned down. Small holes were bored in the earthen pots and the platform sank. (Grant Duff Vol. I, p. 320). Whatever the truth about the manner of Shankaraji's death, the dates and the sequence given by Duff are wrong. Shankaraji met his death in 1707.], rather than prove unfaithful to the oath that he had taken. Thereupon Shahu went to console his aggrieved widow and promised to continue her son Naro Shankar in her husband's post, and confirmed Shankaraji's Mutalik in his office: as before. This measure firmly secured to Shahu the support of Pant Sachiv's party who never afterwards departed from their allegiance to him. Shahu further proceeded to the South and took Chandan Vandan. Tarabai now assigned the task of defending Satara to Pratinidhi and herself fled to Panhala for security and thence subsequently to Malvan. Shahu on approaching Satara seized the families of all who were acting against him and sent an order to Parashuram Trimbak to surrender Satara. Parashuram did not obey, but Shaikh Mirah a Muhammedan officer who commanded under him confined him and gave up the fort [Grant Duff's Marathas, Vol. I, 315.]. On gaining possession of Satara, Shahu formally seated himself on the the throne on 12th January 1708. (Marathi Daftar, Rumal I. p. 118. Edited by V. L. Bhave). Gadadhar Pralhad was appointed Pratinidhi and Bahiropant Pingle was made Peshva. Dhanaji Jadhav was confirmed in his rank of Senapati or chief captain and the right of making collections in several districts was entrusted to him. In the prevailing confusion the revenue was realised on no fixed principle, but was levied as opportunity presented itself in the manner of contribution. The principal writers employed by Dhanaji in revenue affairs were Abaji Purandare, accountant of Sasvad near Poona, and another Brahman accountant originally belonging to Shrivardhan in Janjira, a village claimed by the Sidi, which he had left for a career as early as in 1689 if not earlier. Since then he held different posts as Sar-Subhedar of Poona (Sardesai: Marathi Riyasat 5, Punya Shloka Shahu p. 50) and Daulatabad, and played an important part in the War of Independence as a mediator between the Moghal and the Maratha camps and occasionally extended a helping hand to Shahu during his long period of confinement. In the course of his activities he came to be associated with Purandares of Sasvad and was therefore recommended to Dhanaji by Abaji Purandare and Parashuram Trimbak. The name of the Shrivardhan accountant, afterwards famous as the founder of the Peshva's power, was Balaji Vishvanath Bhatt. Shortly afterwards Dhanaji Jadhav was deputed towards Khandesh for fighting with the Moghals and Shahu himself proceeded to the south towards Panhala and Vishalgad. Having captured the forts he turned his attention towards Rahgana which was defended by Ramechandrapant on behalf of Tarabai. On the approach of the rainy season Shahu's army was cantoned at Panhala. Dhanaji however was not destined to see him as he met his death at Vadganv on the banks of the river Varna, as he was returning after finishing his Khandesh campaign. (27th June 1708) (Sardesai: Marathi Riyasat, Punya Shloka Shahu p. 53). During this period Shahu neglected no preparations to enable him to reduce his rival. Among other expedients he made an unsuccessful application to Sir Nicholas Waite, the Governor of Bombay for a supply of guns, ammunition, European soldiers, and money [Bruce's Annals in Grant Duff's Marathas, Vol. I, 318.].

At the opening of the fair season, after holding the Dasara holiday, preparations were made to renew the war against Tarabai (1709). But about that time an agreement with the Moghals waived the question of hereditary claim and made the reduction of Tarabai less important to Shahu [Grant Duff's Marathas, Vol. I, 319.]. Daud Khan Panni, whom Zulfikar Khan left as his deputy in the Deccan, settled with such Maratha chiefs as acknowledged Shahu's authority, with certain reservations, to allow them one-fourth of the revenue, at the same time reserving the right of collecting and paying it through his own agents. Daud Khan's intimacy with most of the Maratha chiefs, his connection with Zulfikar Khan, and the terms of friendship between Zulfikar and Shahu, not only preserved Shahu's ascendancy, but, except in instances where independent plundering bands occasionally appeared, secured a fairly correct observance of the terms of the agreement. At the close of 1709 Shahu returned to Satara and married two girls, one from the Mohite and the other from the Shirke family. His other two wives who were married to him while in Aurahgzeb's camp were with his mother at Delhi, where one of them, the daughter of Shinde shortly afterwards died. During this period Balaji Vishvanath always acted as the righthandman of shahu. This brought on Balaji the keen jealousy of Dhanaji's son Chandrasen Jadhav, and of several others in his service. In 1710, the army had scarcely returned to Satara, when Tarabai encouraged by the commandant of Panhala, marched from Malvaii in Ratanagiri reinforced by the troops of Phond Savant, and made Panhala and the neighbouring town of Kolhapur her residence. Her hopes were now raised as Chandrasen Jadhav left Shahu and joined Tarabai under circumstances to be narrated later for over three years. Tarabai held her position firmly at Panhala and Shahu was in no mood to disturb her; but in 1714 coup d'etat at Kolhapur in which Tarabai and her son Shivaji were put into prison and Rajasbai and her son Sambhaji were placed on the throne (1714). [According to Jadunath Sarkar Tarabai was removed from administration and her place was taken by Rajas Bai in the year 1712 (Cambridge History, Vol.IV,p.392).] It is believed that Ramechandrapant who was never fully trusted by Tarabai had a hand in this court revolution. Whatever the truth, there is no doubt that Ramchandrapant exerted himself with renewed vigour to reorganise the administration at Kolhapur and uphold the claims of Sambhaji as a rival to Shahu. Still so long as Daud Khan's government continued Shahu was secured in the ascendancy. He was surrounded by most of the experienced ministers and had acquired a name for himself by his conciliatory disposition. It has already been said that he had won over Sachiv to his side. But he was not equally-successful in binding to his interest all the members of the Pratinidhi's family. In 1713. Shahu released Parashuram Trimbak, restored his honours by the removal of Gadadhar Pralhad, and confirmed him in his formal charge of Vishalgad and its dependencies. The Pratinidhi sent his eldest son Krshnaji Bhaskar to assume the management of the fort and district, but he had no sooner obtained possession than he revolted, tendered his services to Sambhaji and was made Pratinidhi at Kolhapur. On this defection Parashuram Trimbak was again thrown into confinement, and Shahu, under the belief that the revolt had been encouraged by him, intended to have put him to death but was dissuaded from his design by the timely mediation of Khando Ballal [Grant Duff's Marathas, Vol. I, 321.]. In consequence of changes at the imperial court, Daud Khan was removed from the government of the Deccan and the agreement between the Moghals and the Marathas was dissolved. Chandrasen Jadhav, who on the death of his father Dhanaji Jadhav had been appointed chief captain, was sent from Satara with a considerable army and directed to levy the chauth, sardeshmukhi, and ghasdana from the Moghal districts. The was attended by his father's accountant Balaji Vishvanath who was now charged with collecting and appropriating a share of the revenue for Shahu, a situation of control which, under no circumstances, was likely to be favourably viewed by Chandrasen. The old jealousy was increased tenfold, and in a dispute about a deer run down by one of Balaji's horsemen, the suppressed hatred burst forth. Balaji was forced to flee for his life. He fled first to Sasvad in Poona but the Sachiv's agent at Sasvad did not think it prudent to protect him. With a few followers, amongst whom were his sons Bajirav and Chimaji, Bajaji attempted to cross to Pandugad, a fort in the opposite valley, but Chandrasen's horsemen were already on his track searching for him everywhere. In this extremity he contrived to hide for a few days until two Marathas, Pilaji Jadhav and Dhumal, then common cavaliers in his service, by their influence with their relations, gathered a small troop of horse, and promised at the risk of their lives to carry him and his sons to the machi or village attached to the hill fort of Pandugad. When Shahu heard of this quarrel between Chandrasen and Balaji he carefully considered the whole case and resolved to extend protection to Bajaji. Thereupon, Chandrasen demanded of Shahu that Bajaji should be given up, and in case of refusal threatened to renounce his allegiance. Shahu, though not prepared to punish this insolent demand, refused to give up Balaji and sent orders to Haibatrav Nimbalkar Sar Lashkar, then near Ahmadnagar, at once to march on Satara. Meanwhile Bajaji Vishvanath was in Pandugad surrounded by the Senapati's troops. Haibatrav, who was annoyed that he had not been made Senapati and was incensed at Chandrasen's behaviour, eagerly obeyed the order to march against him. Hearing of Haibatrav's arrival at Phaltan Chandrasen quitted Pandugad and marched to Devur about fifteen miles to the south-east. The armies met, Chandrasen was defeated, retired to Kolhapur, and from Kolhapur he went to meet Chin Kilich Khan Nizam-ul-mulk, the Moghal viceroy of the Deccan, by whom he was well received and rewarded [Grant Duff's Marathas, 189-191.]. Chandrasen for revenge and Nizam-ul-mulk who was disposed to favour the cause of Sambhaji and desirous of suppressing the ravages of Shahu's officers sent an army against Haibatrav. To support him, Shahu sent forward a body of troops under Balaji Vishvanath whom he now dignified with the title of sena karte i.e. organiser of the army. A battle was fought near Purandhar in Poona, in which the advantage claimed by the Marathas is contradicted by their subsequent retreat to the Salpa pass twenty miles south of Purandhar. A detachment of Marathas from the Moghal army took possession of the Poona district. At length an accommodation was made, hostilities ceased, and the Moghals returned to Aurangabad. When the war was over the emperor Farrukhsiyar appointed Shahu to the command of 10,000 horse. But for seventeen months the policy and vigour of Nizam-ul-Mulk greatly controlled the Marathas. [Grant Duff', Marathas, Vol. I, 331.] During the rains of 1714 the Marathas resumed their depredations. All the deshmukhs and deshpandes in the Moghal districts of Maharashtra fortified their villages on pretence of defending themselves, but they frequently joined or aided their countrymen of whatever party in escape, defence, and concealment [Grant Duffs Marathas, Vol. I, p. 325. Khanderav Dabhade who acknowledged Shahu as his chief and had established himself about Nanded in Rajpipla, carried on depredations at this time in Gujarat.].

Balaji Vishvanath Peshva1713-1720.,

As Nizam-ul-mulk favoured the Kolhapur party, Sambhaji's influence rose aud Shahu's fell. The Ghorpades. both of Kapshi and Mudhol, joined the Kolhapur party. Sidoji Ghorpade, the son of Bahirji and nephew of the famous Santaji also declared for Sambhaji, but, along with his ally the Nawab of Savanur was too intent on his schemes of conquest and plunder to quit the Karnatak [About this time Sidoji gained a great acquisition in the fort of Sondur, a place of singular strength within twenty-five miles of Belari. Grant Duff's Marathas.Vol.I.325.]. Krishnarav Khatavkar, a Brahman, raised to power by the Moghals, took post about the Mahadev hills within Satara limits, and without joining either Satara or Kolhapur plundered the country on his own account. Damaji Thorat, a lawless upstart of the Kolhapur party who acknowledged no chief but his old patron Ramechandrapant, levied contributions in Poona. Udaji Chavhan, another of Ramechandra-pant's officers took the mud fort of Battis Shirala about twenty miles south of Karad, and in a short time became so formidable that Shahu was glad to enter into a compromise by conceding the chauth of Shirala and Karad, which Udaji long continued to receive as a personal allowance. Several other petty wasters declared for Sambhaji. Among these the most formidable was Kanhoji Angre who then held the coast from Savantvadi to Bombay, and was spreading his power over the province of Kalyan in Thana. So great was the anarchy that, without a sudden change of fortune and greater efficiency in Shahu's government, his authority over the Marathas must soon have ceased. Balaji Vishvanath instilled some vigour into his counsels and began to lead in public affairs. He set out to reduce Damaji Thorat; but, together with his frient Abaji Purandhare, and his two sons Bajirav and Chimaji, he was treacherously seized by Thorat and thrown into confinement. After many indignities their ransom was settled and paid by Shahu who now applied to the Sachiv to suppress Thorat. The Sachiv and his manager advanced against Thorat, but they too were defeated and thrown into confinement. At the same time two other expeditions were prepared at Satara, one under the Peshva Bahiropant Pingle which went to guard the Konkan and repel Angre and the other commanded by Balaji Vishvanath was ordered to suppress Krishnarav Khatavkar. Krishnarav had become so bold that he marched to Aundh about ten miles south of-Khatav, to meet Shahu's troops. He was totally defeated principally through the bravery of Shripatrav, the second son of Parashuram Trimbak, the Pratinidhi, whose father had urged him to perform some action which might wipe away the misconduct of his elder brother and procure his father's release. Shahu accordingly once more restored the Pratinidhi to liberty and rank. Krishnarav submitted, was pardoned, and received the village of Khatav. This success was of. considerable importance, but a like good fortune did not attend the Peshva's expedition. Bahiropant was defeated and made prisoner by Angre who' took Lohagad and Rajmachi in West Poona, and was reported to be marching on Satara. All the force that could be spared was gathered to oppose him. It was placed under Balaji Vishvanath whose former connection with Angre would, it was hoped, lead to some settlement. Balaji's negotiations were successful, and Angre, on condition of large cessions [Grant Duff's Marathas, Vol. I, 327. Angre received ten forts and sixteen fortified places of less strength with their dependent villages and was confirmed in command of the fleet and in his title of sarkhel.] in the Kohkan, gave up his Deccan conquests except Rajmachi, renounced Sambhaji, released the Peshva, and agreed to maintain the cause of Shahu. As Balaji performed this service entirely to Shahu's wishes, on his return to Satara he was received with great distinction, and in consequence of the failure of Bahiropant Pingle, that minister was removed from the dignity of Mukhya Pradhan and Balaji appointed Peshva in his stead (1714) [According to Jadunath Sarkar Balaji Vishvanath was appointed on 17th November 1713. (Sardesai - New History of the Marathas, Vol. II, p. 24).]. His friend Abaji Purandare was confirmed as his chief agent or mutalik and Ramajipant Bhanu an ancestor of the celebrated Nana Fadnavis as his fadnavis [Grant Duff's Marathas, Vol. I, 328.]-. After the desertion of Chandrasen Jadhav, Manaji More had received clothes of investiture as chief captain or Senapati, but failed to perform the services which were expected of him. He was now ordered, with Haibatrav Nimbal-kar, to accompany Balaji into the Poona district to reduce Dannaji Thorat. As it was feared that the Sachiv, who was still Thorat's prisoner at Hingahganv in Poona, might be killed if the place were attacked, Yesubai, the Pant Sachiv's mother, prevailed on Balaji to obtain his release before hostilities began. In this Balaji succeeded and Yesubai in gratitude made over to the Peshva the Sachiv's rights in the Poona district and gave him the fort of Purandar as a place of refuge for his family who then lived in Sasvad. Balaji obtained a confirmation of the grant of Purandar from Shahu. The force assembled by Balaji at this time was too powerful for Thorat. His fort was stormed and destroyed and himself made prisoner [Grant Duff's Marathas, Vol. I, 329.].

In 1715 Haibatrav quarrelled with Shahu for not appointing him Senapati, retired to the Godavari, and was never reconciled. The Peshva induced the Moghal agent in the Poona district, a Maratha named Baji Kadam, to make over the superior authority to him, on the promise that Rambhaji Nimbalkar's jagir should be respected [Grant Duff's Marathas, Vol I, 329. The Peshva suppressed sonic banditti which infested the Poona district, restored order in the villages, stopped revenue-farming, and encouraged tillage by low and gradually increasing assessments, Ditto.].

In all quarters Maratha affairs began to improve. Still after a period of such confusion, weakness, and anarchy, the rapid expansion of their power is in any view very remarkable and at first sight seems incredible. The influence of Balaji Vishvanath continued to increase and no affair of importance was undertaken without his advice. A conciliatory policy was agreeable to Shahu and dictated all Balaji's measures. The system of Shivaji was the groundwork of their arrangements; but since the time of Sambhaji (1680-1689), the necessity of preserving the Raja's supremacy by profusely issuing deeds confirming to every successful Maratha leader the possession of all the territory in which he could establish himself, was ruinous both to their union and their resources as a nation. Still the nature of the tribute which Shivaji's genius had instituted suggested a remedy for the endless divisions which every additional acquisition of territory was likely to create. The expedient adopted, which is given below, although it ensured its end only temporarily, must be considered as the most ingenious decree ever adopted by the ingenious persons of those days.

The ministry as far as practicable was composed of the old retainers, and the posts of those who adhered to the Kolhapur party were conferred on their near relations.

About this time both Parsoji Bhonsle and Haibatrav Nimbalkar died. Parsoji's son Kanhoji was confirmed by Shahu in all his father's possessions and succeeded to his title of Sena Saheb Subha, but the rank of Sar Lashkar was conferred on Davalji Somavanshi together with the right and honours of the post. Haibatrav's son, annoyed at being set aside, quitted Shahu's standard and joined Nizam-ul-Mulk. Shahu was not without ability. He was naturally generous, liberal to all religious establishments, observant of the forms enjoined by the Hindu faith, and particularly charitable to Brahmans. The Hilly west Deccan and the rugged Konkan were his birthright, but as his childhood was pleasantly spent in the pomp and luxury of the Moghal camp he had developed easy going habits. He occasionally showed violence and for a time anger overcame his indolence. In general however he was satisfied with the respect and homage paid to his person and the obedience which his ministers invariably professed to his commands. He was pleased at being free from the drudgery of business and in giving himself up to his fondness for hawking, hunting, and fishing, he did not foresee that he was delegating a power which might supersede his own. As legitimate head of the Marathas, the importance of that nation was increased by the manner in which he was courted by the Moghals; and the dignities and rights conferred upon him in consequence of his situation gave an influence and respect to the name of Shahu, which under other circumstances he could never have attained. Both the sons of Shivaji, Sambhaji and Rajaram, followed the example of their father from the period when he mounted the throne and always declared their independence. Shahu acknowledged himself a vassal of the throne of Delhi, and while styling himself king of the Marathas, affected, in his transactions with the Moghals, to consider himself merely as a zamindar or head deshmukh of the empire [Grant Duff's Marathas, Vol. I, 331.].

In 1715 Farrukhsiyar, the emperor of Delhi, becoming jealous of the Sayyid brothers to whom he owed his elevation, appointed the younger Sayyid Husain Ali Khan to the viceroyalty of the Deccan, in the hopes that by separating the brothers he should weaken their power and compass their destruction. In 1716, Khanderav Dabhade. who had established a line of posts along the Surat-Burhanpur route and defeated two large Moghal armies, went to Satara paid his respects to Shahu, and was raised to the rank of Senapati of the empire Manaji More being removed for inability and misconduct. The Maratha officers encouraged by their success and by the secret over hires of Farrukhsiyar now extended their encroachments, and in addition to the chauth which they had agreed to receive from Daud Khan in lieu of all claims, they everywhere levied the sardesmukhi Under these circumstances the Deccan government of Sayyid Husan Ali Khan, distracted by Maratha depredations on one side and con intrigues on the other, had recourse to negotiations with Shahi Shankaraji Malhar originally a writer under Shivaji and appointe Sachiv by Rajaram at Jinji, had retired during the siege of that place to Benares. Tired of a life so little in accord with his former habits although a very old man, Shankaraji took service with Husain Ali Khan when he was appointed to the Deccan. He soon gained the confidence of his master, and at an early period entered into a correspo dence with his friends at Satara. He represented to the. viceroy that if the Maratha claims were recognised, they would have an interest the prosperity of the country; that this was the: only way to restore tranquillity, and a certain means of gaining powerful allies by whose aid he might rest secure from present intrigues, and eventually defy the avowed hostility of the emperor. Husain Ali approving of the views sent Shankaraji Malhar to Satara to arrange an alliance between the Moghals and the Marathas. This mission opened a great prospect to the aspiring mind of Balaji Vishvanath. Besides the chauth and sardeshamukhi of the six subhas of the Deccan including the Bijapur and Hyderabad Karnataks, with the tributary states of Mys Trichinopoli and Tanjore, Shahu demanded the whole of the territory in Maharashtra which had belonged to Shivaji with the exception of his possessions in Khandesh, and in lieu of Khandesh territory near the old districts as far east as Pandharpur was to be substituted. The forts of Shivneri in Poona and of Trimbak in Nasik were also to be given up. The old districts in the Karnatak were also demanded and a confirmation of some conquests lately made by Kanhoji Bhonsle the Sena Saheb Subha in Gondavan and Berar. Lastly the mother and family of Shahu were to be sent from Delhi as soon as practicable. On these conditions Shahu promised to pay to the imperial treasury for the old territory a yearly peshkash or tribute of Rs. 10 lakhs the sardeshmukhi or ten per cent. of the whole revenue he bound himself to protect the country, to put down every form of disorder to bring thieves to punishment or restore the stolen property, and to pay the usual fee of 651 per cent. on the annual income for the hereditary right of sardeshmukhi; for the grant of chauth no fee was to be paid, but he agreed to maintain a body of 15,000 horse in the emperor's service, to be placed at the disposal of the subhedars, fauzdars and officers in different districts. The Karnatak and the subhas of Bijapur and Hyderabad which were then overrun by the partizans of Sambhaji Raja of Kolhapur, Shahu promised to clear of plunderers, and to make good every loss sustained by the people of those provinces after the final settlement of the treaty. Shankaraji Malhar had already sufficiently proved his desire to forward the interests of his countrymen, and Shahu appointed him (1717) to conclude the terms, which, according to the above proposals, were with some exception conceded by Husain Ali Khan.

The territory and forts not under the viceroy's control were to be recovered at some season of leisure or in any manner which Shahu might think fit. Meanwhile a body of 10,000 horse were sent to join the viceroy. Santaji and Parsoji Bhonsle, relations of the Sena Saheb Subha, Udaji Pavar, Vishvasrav and several other commanders were detached in charge of the Maratha troops for this duty. At the same time agents were sent to inquire into the state of the districts and collect the extensive shares of revenue now assigned to them, while the ministers were devising a system, for realising their claims which it was by no means so easy to realise.

The emperor refused (1718) to ratify the treaty. An unworthy favourite encouraged him in his intrigues for the destruction of the Sayyids, he became less guarded in his measures, and as an open rupture seemed inevitable. Husain Ali Khan prepared to march for the capital and solicited aid from Shahu. He also pretended to receive from Shahu a son of Sultan Muhammad Akbar then residing at the Maratha court. Such an opportunity was not neglected. Balaji Vishvanath and Khanderav Dabhade proceeded to join the viceroy with a large body of troops, for which he agreed to pay them a certain sum daily from the date of their crossing the Narmada until their return. Husain Ali Khan further promised that the treaty should be ratified and the family of Shahu released and delivered to his officers. On his departure Shahu instructed Balaji Vishvanath to endeavour to obtain the cession of the forts of Daulatabad and Chanda [Chanda is about a hundred miles south of Nagpur.] and authority to levy the tribute which had for some time been imposed by the Marathas in Gujarat and Malva. The reason for this apparently extraordinary demand was that the chief who had already levied contributions in those provinces would break in and plunder, unless Shahu could receive such an authority as must oblige them to look to him only for what they termed their established contributions, and that under these circumstances Shahu would be responsible for the protection and improvement of their territories. The combined army marched to Delhi where the wretched emperor Farrukhsiyar after some tummult was confined by the Sayyids and put to death. Two princes of the line succeeded and died within seven months. Rohsan Akhtar, the grandson of Sultan Muazzam was then raised (1719) to the imperial dignity with the title of Muhammad Shah, but the two Sayyids held all the power. Balaji Vishvanath and his Marathas remained at Delhi until the accession of Muhammad Shall (1720). During the tumult which preceded the confinement of Farrukhsiyar, Santaji Bhonsle and 1,500 of his men were killed by the populace in the streets of Delhi. The army was paid by the Sayyids, according to agreement, and Shahu's mother and family were given over to Balaji Vishvanath. As both the Peshva and the Senapati were anxious to return to the Deccan they were allowed to leave, and in accordance with the treaty with Husain Ali Khan, they receive three Imperial grants for the chauth, sardeshmukhi, and svarajya [Grant Duffs Marathas, Vol. I,. 337-38. When Grant Duff wrote (1826) the original grants were in the possession of the Raja of Satara. They were in the name of Muhammad Shah, dated in the first year of his reign A. H. 1131 (A. D. 1719). The emperor Muhammad Shah was not placed on the throne till 1720. During the months that intervened between the dethronement of Farrukhsiyar and his elevation, two princes had filled the throne whose names were expunged from the records.]

Grant of Chauth and sardeshmukhi, 1720.

The chauth or one-fourth of the whole revenue of the six subhas of the Deccan including the Hyderabad and Bijapur, Karnataks and the tributry states of Tanjore, Trichinopoli and Mysore [The deed for the chauth dated 22nd Rabi-ul-Akhir A. H. 1131 granted to Shahu the fourth of the revenue of the six suhhas of the Deccan simply on condition that he should maintain 15,000 horse to aid the military governors in keeping order. Grand Duff's Marathas, Vol. 1, p. 337 note.], the sardes-mukhi or ten per cent. over and above the chauth [The sardeshmukhi grant is dated 4th Jamadi-ul-Aval or twelve days after that of the chauth. It does not specify in the body of the deed that it is granted as an hereditary right; hut the customary fee on such occasions stated on the back of the instrument as follows:

The Sardeshmukhi was estimated at- Rs. 1,80,51,730. Peshkash or establish fee on hereditary rights conferred, 651 per cent., amounted to Rs. 11,75,16,762 the immediate payment on delivering the deed to one-fourth or Rs. 2,93,79,190-8-0; the remainder payable by instalments to Rs. 8,81,37,571-8-0 The fee so calculated was commuted to Rs. 1,17,19, 390 in consequence of the depopulated state of the country. Grant Duff's Marathas Vol. I, p. 338 (footnote).] ; and the svarajya literally, Self Rule, that is the districts held by Shivaji at the time of his death, which were granted to Shahu, excepting the detached possessions in Khandesh, the fort of Trimbak with the adjoining district, and the conquests south of the Vardha and the Tungabhadra rivers, which were not ceded. In lieu of such of these claims as lay to the north of the Bhima, districts beyond the line of forts from Tathvad to Machhindragad in Satara, as far east as Pandharpur, were wholly ceded to Shahu, and also those districts which Aurangzeb had promised to him at the time of his marriage in that emperor's camp. The country watered by the Yerla, Man, and Nira, celebrated for good horse and hardy men, the home of some of the oldest families in Maharashtra, who had not hitherto formally acknowledged the descendants of Shivaji, including the whole of the present district of Satara, was by this cession placed under Shahu's authority [The following is a list of the sixteen districts included in the grant of svarajya; Poona, Supa, including Baramati, Indapur, Wai, the Mavals, Satara. Karad, Khatav, Man, Phaltan, Malkapur, Tarla, Panhala, Ajra, Junnar, and Kolhapur; the parganas north of the Tungbhadra including Kopal, Gadag, Haliyal, and all the forts which were captured by Shivaji; the Konkan including. Ramnagar, Gandevi, Jawhar, Chenl, Bhiwandi, Kalyan, Rajpuri, Dabhol, Javli, Rajapur, Phonda, Ankola. and Kudal. Grant Puff's Marathas, Vol I, 338]. The Marathas pretended that the conquests of Berar by Parsoji and Kanhoji Bhonsle, and their right to tribute in Gujarat and Malva were confirmed at the same time; but though some very indefinite verbal promise may have been given and Balaji Vishvanath left an agent for the purpose as is alleged of receiving the sanads, subsequent events prove the unwillingness of Delhi authorities to implement the understanding.

When Balaji Vishvanath started for Delhi, he left his divan Abaji Purandare as his mutalik or deputy in charge of his seal of office, and the duties of Peshva continued to be carried on at the Maratha court in Bajaji's name. On Balaji's return to Satara with the Imperial deed the scheme for collecting and distributing the revenue which all admit to have been projected by Balaji was examined, and the system which had already been partially introduced was now openly accepted. The sardeshmukhi or ten per cent, on the revenues of the subhas of the Deccan was first set aside and termed by the ministers the Raja's vatan, a gratifying sound to the ears of a Maratha whether prince or peasant. The imposition of the sardeshmukhi reduced to a proportionate degree the actual collections from a country the resources of which were already drained to the utmost, but the nominal revenue continued the same. To have collected even one-fourth of the standard assessment would probably at this period have been impossible but the Marathas in all situations endeavoured to secure, in lieu of their chauth, at least twenty-five per cent, of the real balances. Although they seldom could collect it, they always stated the chauth as due upon the tankha or standard assessment, because of their anxiety to maintain the dignity of what after all, came to be a paper transaction, but which always gave them a legal excuse to press their claims of receiving their dues in full. In regard to the sardeshmukhi, it suited both their foreign and domestic policy to keep that claim undefined; but their system in practice, that of exacting as much as they could, was as simple as it was invariable. Of the seventy-five per cent, which remained to the Moghals, one-third or twenty-five per cent, was received according to established usage by the fauzdar and the balance was collected sometimes for the Imperial ex-chequer but generally on account of some jagirdar, to whom most of the Moghal conquests in the Deccan were assigned for the support of troops. This general mode of appropriating the revenue explains the seizures, resumptions, and cessions of territory under the name of jagir during the later wars in the Deccan between the Nizam and the Peshva. It likewise explains the practice which prevailed in many villages, even up to the British conquests, of bringing fifty per cent., of the net revenue to account under the head of jagir, for which the kulkarni in less than a century could assign no reason except the custom of their forefathers. The term svarajya or Self Rule, which in the first instance was applied to that part of the territory north of the Tungbhadra possessed by Shivajl at his death, on the return of Balaji Vishvanath was extended to the whole of the Maratha claims exclusive of the sardeshmukhi. Of these claims one-fourth or twenty-five per cent, was appropriated to the head of the state in addition to the sardeshmukhi. This fourth was known by the name of the Raja's babti. The balance was termed mokasa. Of the mokasa two shares were left at the disposal of the Raja; the on was Sahotrd or six per cent, and the other nadgauda or three pe cent., both calculated on the whole svarajya. The balance of mokas was sixty-six per cent, of the whole of the Maratha claims exclusive of the sardeshmukhi. The sahotra was bestowed by Shahu on the Pant Sachiv as an hereditary assignment; it was collected by the Sachiv's own agents only within the territory wholly possessed by the Marathas; separate collectors were sent by the Raja to realise it in distant districts. The nadgauda was granted to different persons at the Raja's pleasure. Independent of salaries from the treasury the Pradhans had many inam villages conferred on then Balaji Vishvanath received several districts near Poona in person; Jagir, including the fort of Lohagad. The Pratinidhi, the Peshvi and the Pant Sachiv were charged with the collection of the babti on the Raja's account. Thus there were distinct agents for realising the babti and sardeshmukhi, for the Sahotra of the Pant Sachiv, for the nadgauda of the assignee to whom it belonged, and for the mokasa to different officers for maintaining troops. The mokasa was distributed among a great number of chiefs as military jagir, burdened according to the circumstances with dues to the head of the state both of money and of troops. The districts of old Maratha Jagirdars were freed from the chauth but they were generally liable to the payment of sardeshmukhi, besides furnishing their quota of horse. Such jagirs, in a grant of Mokasa for a large tract were always stated as deductions and long before districts were conquered, formal grants and assignments of their revenue were distributed. Number less personal Jagirs and inams of lands of whole villages were alienate by Shahu; the former commonly required the performance of some service but the latter were entirely freehold. The Raja's authority was considered necessary to collect the revenue thus conceded, but the authority for which they were constantly petitioning was a formal affair. The revenue collectors thought that the Raja's sanad was sufficient for levying tribute in districts not specified in the imperial deeds. A district once overrun was said to be under tribute from usage; other districts were plundered by virtue of letters patent.

Particular quarters of the country were assigned to the leading officers, which, as far as they can now be ascertained, were as follows. The Peshva and Senapati charged with the command of a great proportion of the Raja's personal troops, were ordered to direct their attention to the general protection and defence of the territory. The Peshva had authority to levy the government dues in Khandesh and part of the Balaghat to the north-east of Sholapur; the senapati was vested with similar authority in Baglan and a right to realise the dues established by usage from Gujarat. Kanhoji Bhonsle the Sena Saheb Subha had charge of Berar Payinghat and was privileged to conquer and exact tribute from Gondvan to the east. The Sar Lashkar had Gangthadi including part of Aurangabad. Fateh Sing Bhonsle was appointed to the Karnatak; while the general charge of the old territory from the Nira to the Varna, and the collections from Hyderabad and Bedar were left to the Pratinidhi and the immediate agents of the Raja. The Chitnis had particular charge of several districts in the Konkan. The Pant Sachiv enjoyed the revenue of the whole Sahotra besides his old possessions in Jagir. The agents for collecting the Raja's zamindar dues were styled naib sardeshmukhs. Kanhoji Angre, retaining his districts in the Konkan, levied his chauth, as he termed it, by continuing to plunder the ships of all nations that appeared on the coast without his permission and would not recognise his right of sovereignty over sea. He used to pay a tribute to the Raja in guns, muskets, military stores, and ammunition. He also presented frequent nazars in articles from Europe and China; and he was sometimes charged with the very extraordinary duty of executing state criminals.

All the principal Maratha officers as a further means of preserving intercourse and union had particular claims assigned to them on portions of revenue or on whole villages in the district of each other. The greatest Maratha commanders or their principal revenue agents were eager to own their native village; but although vested with the control, they were proud to acknowledge themselves of the family of the patil or kulkarni; and if heirs to a miras field, they would sooner have lost wealth and rank than been dispossessed of such a vatan or inheritance. Yet on obtaining the absolute sovereignty, they never assumed an authority in the interior village concerns beyond the rights and privileges acquired by birth or purchase, according to the invariable rules of the country. Such is a brief outline of the system and arrangements settled by the Maratha ministry on the return of Balaji Vishvanath; and such was the mode by which a common interest was created, and for a time preserved, among the Maratha chiefs; while the character of Shahu, the influence and power of Balaji Vishvanath, the ability of his sons Bajirav and Chimaji to give a lead to the Maratha confederacy paved the way, though by gradual steps, for the supermacy of the Peshvas.

Nizam Independent,1720,

In 1720, Nizam-ul-mulk the governor of Malva, throwing off his dependence on the Sayyids, determined to possess himself of the Deccan. He overran Khandesh and defeated the Moghal troops under Dilavar Ali Khan at Burhanpur slaying their commander. The troops of Shahu under Kanhoji Bhonsle, the Sena Saheb Subha, and Haibatrav Nimbalkar speedily joined Shankaraji Malhar who since the departure of Husain Ali Khan had lived with the deputy viceroy Alam Ali Khan as the envoy of Shahu. Khanderav Dabhade who had just returned from Delhi was likewise despatched from Satara with a body of horse. Alam Ali Khan was defeated at Balapur in Berar Payinghat by the troops of Nizam-ul-mulk, and fell surrounded by Marathas slain in his defence (10th August 1720). On this occasion the Marathas behaved as faithful auxiliaries and fought with bravery. They lost no person of note except Shahkaraji Malhar who was mortally wounded and made prisoner [Grant Duffs Marathas, Vol. I, 349.]. Soon after, events happened at Delhi by which the power of the Sayyids was destroyed, Muhammad Shah was freed from their control and Nizam-ul-mulk confirmed as viceroy of the Deccan [Grant Duff's Marathas, Vol. I, 351.]. Meanwhile several important changes had taken place at the Maratha court, chiefly owing to the death of two leading ministers, Parashuram Trimbak in 1718, and Balaji Vishvanath in 1720. Shripatrav the second son of the Pratinidhi had succeeded his father Parashuram Trirhbak before the return of Balaji Vishvanath from Delhi. The Peshva's health had suffered from the fatigue of the journey to Delhi and the labour he had bestowed on different arrangements after his return. He obtained leave from Shahu to retire for a short time to Sasvad in Poona where his family resided, but his constitution was exhausted and he survived for only a few days.

Bajirav BallalPeshva,1720-1740.

At the time of his death (2nd April 1720), he left two sons Bajirav and Chimaji. The robes of Peahvaship were conferred upon Bajirav in Shahu's camp at Masur, 30 miles east of Satara on 17th April 1720 exactly a fortnight after his father's death [Sardesai; New History of the Marathas, Vol. II, p. 66.]. The rise of Gaikvads is almost contemporary, for the troops of Khanderao Dabhade behaved with so great bravery in the battle of Bajapur and one of his officers Damaji Gaikvad the ancestor of the Gaikvads of Baroda so particularly distinguished himself on that occasion, that on his return the young Peshva Bajirav recommended him to Shahu in the warmest manner. The Raja in consequence; appointed him second in command under Khanderav with the title of Samsher Bahadur. Damaji died soon afterwards and was succeeded by his nephew Pilaji Gaikvad. Chimaji the second son of the late Peshva, who received Supa in jagir was appointed to a similar command under his brother Bajirav Abajipant Purandare, their father's chief manager, according to the rule of appointment, was reinvested by Shahu with scrupulous ceremony. During the short interval between the death of Balaji Vishvanath and the appointment of Bajirav, Abajipant Purandare transacted ordinary affairs with the seal of the late Peshva; but a great part of the business fell into the hands of Khando Ballal chitnis and Shripatrav Pratinidhi. Khando Ballal gave his attention principally to the Angre, the Sidi, and the affairs of the Konkan; while the Pratinidhi aided by Anandrav Suinant Pradhao conducted important negotiations with Nizam-ul-mulk. Anandrav's son Mahtaji was employed as Shahu's agent with Nizam-ul-mulk, who while he apprehended an attack from Husain Ali Khan, conciliated Shahu by promising to give up all that the royal grants conceded. No sooner was he apprised of the ascendancy acquired by his party at Delhi and of the loss the Marathas had sustained in the death of Balaji Vishvanath than he began to start objections to the establishment of Shahu's collectors, founded on some pretensions set up by Sambhaji and Chandrasen Jadhav. The wise precautions of Balaji Vishvanath, and the communion of interest which the distribution of the ceded revenue had produced, placed the Raja of the Marathas in a far more commanding situation than that in which he had stood during the first period of Nizam-ul-mulk's government of the Deccan. The agent remained at Aurahgabad where his arrangements would probably have been of little avail, but a vast army of Marathas that was assembling in the Gangthadi under the Sar Lashkar Sultanji Nimbalkar inflicted a crushing defeat upon the Moghals on 15th December 1720 and it was this show of force that ultimately has tend the delivery of orders on the part of Nizam-ul-mulk to allow Raja Shahu to establish his collectors. A fresh order or farman obtained by the Maratha. agent at Delhi from Muhammad Shall opportunely arrived to remove from Nizam-ul-mulk the appearance of having yielded to menace, and afforded an opportunity of evincing the promptitude with which he obeyed the imperial commands [Grant Duff's Marathas, Vol. I, 354.].

Bajirav soon alter his appointment as Peshva set out with an army for Khandesh where he levied his Mokasa although not without opposition. From the period of his accession he gave a considerable portion of his attention to extending Maratha conquests to the north, and his aims were early turned to Malva. Circumstances generally obliged him to return yearly to Satara and Poona. During the three expeditions, before the rains of 1724, though he had sent detachments into Malva, it is not ascertained that he crossed the Narmada in person until the end of that year; nor did he remain in Malva for any length of time until upwards of eleven years after his accession as Peshva. Affairs in the Deecan required his presence, and with the intrigues of Nizam-ul-mulk and domestic opposition, restrained both his ambition and enterprise. At different times before the year 1724 Bajirav had defeated the Subheddr of Burhanpur and an officer named Daud Khan sent against him by Azim-ulla Khan from Malva. In one of these battles two of Bajirav's officers who afterwards rose to high rank first came into notice. One was Malharji Holkar a Shiledar or self-horsed trooper who commanded a party of his own horse. He was a Maratha Dhangar, a native of the village of Hol on the Nira, of which his father was chaugula or Patil's assistant. He had served under Kanthaji Kadam Bande one of the Raja's officers and had gathered a small body of horse. The other officer was Ranoji Shinde descended from a younger branch of the family of Kanhairkhed a village fifteen miles east of Satara. The Shindes according to local legends have been distinguished horsemen since the time of the Bahamani dynasty. There are two Maratha families or rather clans named Shinde, the one distinguished by their hereditary patil village of Kanhairkhed and the other by the title of Ravirav. Both families claim Rajput descent. Those of Kanhairkhed had a mansab under Aurangzeb and Shinde's daughter, who was given in marriage by that emperor to Shahu, died in captivity at Delhi. Shinde remained faithful to the Moghals, and, as his fate was never known, it is conjectured that he was killed in some distant country possibly with Azam Shah in the battle of Agra in 1707. The family had fallen into decay and Ranoji who revived its fame was reduced to a state of abject poverty serving as a bargir or rider first in the troop of Balaji Vishvanath and afterwards in that of Bajaji's son. To contrast this original with his subsequent condition, he is said to have carried the Peshva's slippers, and to have been marked by Bajirav as fitted for a place of trust by the care he took of his humble charge.

Another officer who gained fresh honour about this time was Udaji Pavar Vishvasrav. His father was first raised by Ramchandrapant Amatya when he governed the country during the siege of Jinji, and the young man joined Shahu and obtained the command of a considerable body of horse. He was employed on various services and appears to have been an active partisan. Like most contemporary Maratha leaders of experience, such as Kanthaji Kadam Bande, Pilaji Gaikvad, and Kanhoji Bhonsle, he calculated on the surest advantage in the most distant ventures where his appearance was least expected. He made incursions into Gujarat and Malva, plundered Gujarat as far as Lunavada. and found Malva so drained of troops that he was able to remain some time in the country intimating to the Raja that if supported, he might collect the chauth and sardeshmukhi in every direction. How long he maintained his station in the country on his first inroads is uncertain, but it is probable that he was obliged to retire from Dhar, a fortress in the west of Malva where he first established himself, upon the appointment of Girdhar Bahadur, whose exertion in the defence of Malva was the chief cause which prevented the Marathas getting a firm footing in that province for more than ten years after the accession of Bajirav.

The progress of Udaji Pavar, the successes of Kanthaji Kadam Bande and Pilaji Gaikvad in Gujarat, and the dissensions between Nizam-ul-Mulk and the Imperial court opportunely occurred to favour the Peshva's views of spreading Maratha conquests in North India. Bajirav who was early trained by his father to business was bred a soldier as well as a statesman. He united the enterprise, vigour, and hardihood of a Maratha chief with the polish, astuteness, and address of a clever diplomat. He was fully acquainted with his father's financial schemes and chose the part of the plan which was calculated to direct the predatory hordes of Maharashtra in a common effort. The genius of Bajirav enlarged his father's schemes, and unlike many belonging to his caste, he had both the head to plan and the hand to do. To the unceasing industry and minute watchfulness, he added a judgment that taught him the leading points of importance which tended to spread Maratha sway. Bajirav's views of spreading Maratha power in Upper India were at first disapproved by Shahu, and from prudence as well as rivalry were opposed by Shripatrav, the Pratinidhi. Jealousy in public places is a passion which some persons can rarely command or hide. This rivalry between Bajirav, the Konkanasth Peshva and Shripatrav, the Deshasth Pratinidhi probably tended to preserve the Raja's ascendancy longer. The Peshvas first proposal for exacting what he called the established tribute from Malva and extending Maratha conquests into North India was violently and for a time successfully opposed by the Pratinidhi. Shripatrav represented it as rash and imprudent. He held that, though the head of the State might not be called to account for casual inroads, to allow the Peshva to make raids must draw on the Marathas the whole power of the empire, and precipitate hostilities with Nizam-ul-Mulk whose victorious army was still at their gates; that so far from being prepared for resistance there was a total want of regularity even in their arrangements, that they could scarcely quell a common insurrection; and that to enter on a war before they had secured what had been ceded was the extreme of folly and of rashness. The Pratinidhi added that he was a soldier as well as the Peshva, and when expedient as ready as Bajirav to head an expedition; that after they had established their collectors and arranged other parts of the country it would be advisable, before pursuing their conquests in the north, to reduce the Karnatak and to recover the countries conquered by Shivaji; that Fatehsing Bhonsle's troops could scarcely venture to cross the Krshna, and that the first efforts should be made in that quarter.

These were probably the real opinions of Shripatrav. The wisdom of Bajirav was of a higher order. He comprehended the nature of predatory power; he perceived its growth in the turbulence and anarchy for which the system of distributing the revenue was the first remedy; he foresaw that confusion abroad would tend to order at home; that as commander of distant expeditions he should acquire the direction of a larger force than any other chief of the empire; that the resources of the Deccan would not only improve by withdrawing the hordes of horse which unprofitably consumed them, but must fall under the control of that person who could most readily procure employment and subsistance for the troops. While Bajirav concealed his private designs and partly admitted the justice of Shripatrav's views, he endeavoured by his commanding eloquence to arouse enthusiasm or ambition in Shahu. He went over the conquests of Shahu's famous grandfather and reminded him of the powerful kings and the mighty emperor with whom Shivaji had successfully contended. He painted the present condition of India, the weakness, indolence and imbecility of the Moghals, and the activity, energy and enterprise of the Marathas. If, he said, the great Shivaji had been of the same; opinion as the Pratinidhi, he would have thought it necessary before venturing into the Karnatak to reduce bijapur and Golkonda. As to their domestic quarrels beyond the Krshna, it would be time to think of them hereafter; by the Raja's good fortune every desire would be accomplished. Bajirav ended a speech of considerable length, with the words: Now is our time to drive strangers from the land of the Hindus and to gain undying renown. By turning our efforts to North India the Maratha flag shall fly from the Krshna to the Attak. You shall plant it, replied Shahu, in the Kinnar Khand beyond the Himalayas; a noble son of a worthy father. Let us strike, said Bajirav, at the trunk of the withering tree; the branches must fall of themselves.

At what time Shahu's consent was obtained is not known. The form of obtaining the Raja's consent on all such occasions was rigidly observed by the Peshvas at a stage when their supremacy was far advanced. By virtue of that authority and their station as mukhya pradhans or chief ministers, even when their usurpation became complete, it befitted their constitutional status to act as nominal servants and real masters to rule the Maratha chiefs as the delegate of their prince [ Grant Duffs Marathas, Vol. T, 362.].

During the early years of his Peshvaship, Bajirav had to tread the ground very carefully; for Bajirav knew that Niam-ul-Mulk was not the man who would easily forget that the Marathas had helped Alam Ali at Balapur. He had also to encounter Mubariz Khan who had been specially commissioned by the previous Emperors to punish the Marathas for their encroachments and who therefore bore a bitter enmity towards them. Bajirav had to make a choice and to decide whom to placate and whom to antagonisc. A personal diplomatic meeting with Nizam-ul-Mulk on 4th January 1721 at Chikalthan, east of Chalisganv yielded no fruitful result. At this hour Nizam-ul-Mulk was called to Delhi by the Emperor for accepting Wazirship. After some hesitation he decided to go' to Delhi entrusting his charge of the Deccan to Mubariz Khan. (21st October 1721). He, however, soon realised that he could not hold his position in the flippant atmosphere of Delhi politics and decided to choose the earliest opportunity to return to the Deecan with a view to hold almost an independent position of power there, although he would not mind nominally acknowledging the suzerainty of the Emperor. Accordingly, resigning his Wazirship on 27th December 1723 he marched straight to the South, informing the Emperor that he felt it his imperative duty to drive the Marathas from Malva and Gujarat. By long and rapid marches he reached Ujjain. The enraged Emperor decided to punish the rebel Nizam-ul-Mulk and called upon Mubariz Khan and Raja Shahu to do their best to put him down with all the force at their command. This proved a welcome opportunity for Bajirav, who proceeded to the north, crossed Narmada on 8th May and arrived in close proximity to the Nizam's camp at Sihore. Mubariz Khan was for some time undecided as to what course he should take, whether to obey the imperial orders and fight the Nizam or to befriend him. Nizam however took his own decision to placate the Marathas and light with Mubariz Khan. At this hour Mubariz Khan also had opened negotiations with the Marathas when he discovered that he had to face Nizam-ul-Mulk. This gave an opportunity to the Marathas to raise their demands and gain supremacy not only in the Deccan but also in Malva and Gujarat. There was a formal meeting between Nizam-ul-Mulk and Bajirav at Nalchha near Dhar on 18th May 1724 where usual diplomatic formalities were undergone but ultimately each one was left guessing as to what course the other would follow. Nizam now lost no time in proceeding to the south and met his rival Mubariz Khan in the battle of Sakharkhedla on 30th September 1721 where he gained a decisive victory and Mubariz Khan was killed. The Emperor now made a virtue out of necessity and confirmed Nizam as the Subhedar of the Deccan and appointed Girdharbahadur as the Subhedar of Malva. The battle of Sakharkhedla is a turning point in the history of the Later Moghals as it marks the gradual disintegration of the Moghal Empire; for. Nizam henceforth no longer cared to receive orders from Delhi and followed his own policy in maintaining his own position.

In 1725, Hamid Khan, the uncle of Nizam-ul-Mulk, for the aid he gave him against Mubariz Khan, granted the chauth in Gujarat to Kanthaji Kadam Bande and Pilaji Gaikvad, who proceeded to levy their assignments,. The division of the money led to prepetual disputes. Pilaji, as the agent of Dabhade, Senapati, considered himself the superior authority in Gujarat and Kanthaji as an officer of the Raja despised his pretensions. An agreement was signed by which the chauth east of the Mahi was assigned to Pilaji and that to the west to Kanthaji [Grant Duff's Marathas, Vol. I, 365.]. Meanwhile Bajirav took advantage of the confusion caused by Moghal dissensions to carry his arms into Malva, where, though opposed by Raja Girdhar, he was successful for two seasons in obtaining plunder and contributions. It is probable that Nizam-ul-Mulk against whom the Imperial forces were acting in Gujarat, may have connived at his incursions, but there is no proof of any direct communication with the Peshva. Bajirav, by virtue of the authority vested in him by Shahu granted deeds to Pavar, Holkar, and Shinde to levy chauth and sardeshmukhi and to keep half the mokasa in payment of their troops. In 1726, the peshva with a large army under Fatehsing Bhonsle, marched into the Madras Karnatak, plundered the districts, and levied a contribution from Seringapattam. The Marathas lost a number of men without gaining the expected advantages. Bajirav had objected to the expedition, and was dissatisfied with the result, and on returning to Satara he found more serious reasons of dissatisfaction in the measures pursued by the Pratinidhi. The cause of his displeasure originated in the artful schemes of Nizam-ul-Mulk, which, but for the penetration and vigour of Bajirav, would probably have unlinked the chain by which Balaji Vishvanath had joined the interests as well as the inclinations of most of the Hindu chieftains of the Deccan [Grant Duffs Marathas, Vol. I, 367.].

In 1727 Nizam-ul-Mulk, though relieved from immediate apprehensions from the Delhi Emperor Muhammad Shah whose power was daily declining, became alarmed at the spreading power of the Marathas. He beheld in their systematic and persevering encroachments on the divided revenue of the Deccan and the Karnatak, the extinction of his own resources as well as those of the empire, and took measures to avert these evils by endeavouring to consolidate his own power and to create divisions among the Marathas. In these measures he overlooked the ability of his opponent Bajirav and little thought that the pursuit of his own schemes should strengthen the power of the Peshva. He had fixed on Hyderabad, the ancient capital of the Kutb Shahi kings, as fittest for the seat of his new government, and was anxious on any terms to remove the Maratha collectors from that quarter. Although Nizam-ul-Mulk had confirmed the Imperial grant in Shahu's favour, a great deal of what was yielded was not actually given up. Numerous points had remained unadjusted. Shahu's part of the agreement to prevent plundering was not fulfilled and constant discussions were the consequence. A new authority for a part of the old territory was granted by Nizam-ul-Mulk, which particularly specified the fixed personal jagirs that Shahu agreed to exempt from sequestration. Jagir assignments in the old territory about Poona which the Nizam had given to Rambhaji Nimbalkar one of the disaffected officers who had joined him, were exchanged for new grants to the eastward about Karmala, a measure on the part of Nizam-ul-Mulk particularly conciliatory to Shahu. After this a settlement was concluded through the Pratinidhi by which Shahu agreed to relinquish the chauth and sardeshmukhi in the neighbourhood of Hyderabad. An equivalent in money was to be paid for the chauth, and for the sardeshmukhi Shahu received some jagir territory near Indapur in Poona of which district he was an hereditary deshmukh [Half of this deshmukhi was bought by Shahaji Bhonsle, the father of Shivaji after he entered the service of Mahmud Adil Shah. Grant Duff's Marathas, Vol. I, p. 369, note 2.], and a jagir in Berar was conferred on the Pratinidhi. Nizam-ul-Mulk had thus effected his first object by negotiation, but the exchange met with the decided disapproval of Bajirav who was ever an enemy to consolidation and disputes ran so high between him and the Pratinidhi that Nizam-ul-Mulk, encouraged by appearances and the support and alliance of Chandrasen Jadhav, Rav Rambha Nimbalkar jagirdar of Barsi, and Sambhaji Raja of Kolhapur, resolved to complete the design he had formed. With this view he espoused the cause of Sambhaji and endeavoured to create a complete division in the Maratha government by reviving the former feuds between Shahu and Sambhaji.

Nizam-ul-Mulk began by formally bearing the claims of Sambhaji in a demand made for an equal division of the revenue; and according to a prevalent custom in the Deccan, sequestrated the property in dispute by removing the collectors of the sardeshmukhi and displacing the mokasadars of Shahu until their respective rights should be adjusted. Assuming this privilege as viceroy he pretended to become the friend and arbiter of both parties. Bajirav was not to be duped by the old artifice of engaging the Maratha cousins in an hereditary dispute. He quickly turned the Nizam's weapons to his own advantage, for Shahu, true to the feeling of a Maratha, of whom even among the peasantry the mildest men became violent when a vatan is concerned, though for some time he had been reconciled to Nizam-ul-Mulk, was at once on hearing of this interference roused to implacable resentment against him, and for the time against all who had vindicated or who dared to justify his conduct. He looked to Bajirav for counsel and for vengeance; for these he would have bartered life, and for these he virtually sold the supremacy of his empire. At first he determined to lead his army, but it was represented that to march in person would place him on an equality with Sambhaji of Kolhapur; none but the emperor was worthy of contending with the king of the Hindus. Full powers were therefore given to Bajirav. The great influence which the Peshva had gained was shown in the promptness with which many of the most unruly and factious of the Shiledar families gathered round the standard of the nation.

Nizam-ul-Mulk perceived his mistake, and sought to amend it by writing to Shahu and the Pratinidhi that he was solely actuated by a wish to benefit the Raja in order to prevent the usurpation of the Konkani Brahmans by whose creatures every situation was filled; that the mokasdars and collectors of the sardeshmukhi had been replaced by others belonging to the Raja's relation, Sambhaji, whom he had appointed the Raja's deputy, as Sardeshmukh of the six subhas of the Deccan; and that the Raja when freed from the control of the Konkani Brahmans might afterwards appoint agents entirely of his own selection. But Shahu was too shrewd to be misled by such specious pleas and far from falling a victim to the cunning plans of creating a rift between him and Bajirav in this manner, they resolved to teach Nizam lesson. Both parties prepared to attack each other as soon as the rains should subside and enable their horse to cross the rivers. In the war that ensued, Bajirav ravaged Jalna and Mahur, made a lightening dash into Gujarat and Khandesh and finally inflicted a severe defeat upon Nizam at Palkhed near Paithan in 1728, forcing him to agree to negotiations. Bajirav demanded that Sambhaji should be sent to his camp; that security should be afforded for the future collection of the Maratha shares of the revenue by giving up several fortified places; and that all arrears not yet realised should be made good. Nizam-ul-Mulk agreed to all the articles except that of delivering up Sambhaji. Bajirav pointed out that he was a near relation of the Raja's and that he would be treated with equal respect. It was at last settled that Nizam-ul-Mulk should guarantee his safe arrival in Panhala, when Shahu should be at liberty to take what steps he might think proper for the settlement of their family dispute. Battle of Palkhed is thus an important landmark in the history of the Marathas, as it once for all settled the dispute between Bajirav and the Pratinidhi, prevented the Nizam from making pretensions to playing the role of a middleman between the rival, parties at the Maratha Court and finally led the Maratha nobility to look to Bajirav as the maker of Maratha destiny.

Bajirav was then negotiating with Sar Buland Khan who was then the Subhedar of Gujarat, in hopes of obtaining the cession of the Chauth and sardeshmukhi of that province. After the ratification of the treaty with Nizam-ul-mulk, Chimaji Appa, the Peshva's brother marched with large army and exacted a heavy contribution from Petlad and plundered Dholka, but on promising that if the chauth and sardeshmukhi were yielded the districts should be secured from depredation, Sar Buland Khan agreed to the Peshva's proposals, and in 1729 granted the sardeshmukhi or ten per cent, of the whole revenue both on the land and customs except the port of Surat and the district round it, together with the chauth or one-fourth of the whole collections on the land and customs except Surat, and five per cent. on the revenues of the city of Ahmadabad.

In 1729, Muhammad Khan Bangash, the new governor of Malva having entered Bundelkhand and established himself in the territory of Raja Chhatrasal, the Rajput Prince solicited aid from Bajirav. Aid was readily granted. Bangash Khan was reduced to the greatest distress and the province was evacuated by his troops. Chhatrasal in return for this service conferred on Bajirav a fort and district in the neighbourhood of Rs. 2¼ lakhs of yearly revenue. Grant Dulf's story that Chhatrasal adopted Bajirav as his son, and at his death, which happened soon after, bestowed on him one-third of his possessions or an equal share with his two sons Jagatraj and Hirdesa is not borne out by reliable records [D. V. Potdar's essay in Historical and Economic studies p. 7.]. In 1734, Raja jaysingh was appointed to the government of the provinces of Agra and Malva and nothing could be more favourable to the views of Bajirav. As Jaysingh was situated, the honour of the Rajput was at variance with the subsisting arrangement between him and the Marathas. This may account for his hesitating to comply with their demands, but he at last came to an agreement with Bajirav and yielded him the government of Malva. in the following year, and for the time the emperor, by Jaysingh's persuasions, tacitly acquiesced in the arrangement [Grant Duff's Marathas, Vol. I, p. 382.].

During the Peshva's absence Kanhoji Bhonsle, the Sena Saheb Subha had been accused of disobedience and confined at Satara, and Raghuji the son of Kanhoji's cousin Bimbaji had been appointed Send Saheb Subha in his stead (1729). Raghuji had accompanied Shahu in his excursions and by his boldness and skill as a hunter had ingratiated himself with Shahu-and obtained a great ascendancy over him. Shahu married him to the sister of one of his own wives of the Shirke family, which, except their having the same surname, and that possibly they may have been originally relations and rivals for the hereditary right or patil of their villages, is the only connection which can be traced between the Bhonsle families of Satara and Nagpur [Grant Duff's Marathas, Vol. I, p. 384. There is a tradition of their having been rivals in hereditary dispute which may have been invented to prejudice the Raja of Satara against the Bhonsles of Nagpur and to Prevent their desire to adopt any member of that family. It is a point of honour to maintain the herditary difference.]. On receiving the sanads for Berar, Raghuji gave a bond to maintain a body of 5,000 horses for the service of the State, to pay yearly a sum of Rs. 9 lakhs and exclusive of ghasdana or forage money, a tribute which since the time of Rajaram, the Send Saheb Subha had been allowed to reserve, and also to pay to the head of the government half of all other tribute, prize, property, and contributions. He also bound himself to raise 10,000 horses when required and to accompany the Peshva or to proceed to any quarter where he might be ordered. This arrangement was effected during the absence of Shripatrav Pratinidhi who had been sent into the Konkan by the Raja. The Pratinidhi being the friend of Kanhoji Bhonsle endeavoured to obtain some mitigation of his sentence, but failed. Kanhoji, who was an officer of great enterprise died at Satara in 1734, after having lived there for about four years a prisoner at large [He had made some partial conquests in Gondvan and headed one incursion into Cuttak,].

While Bajirav's presence was necessary in the north to support Chimaji in Gujarat, Sambhaji Raja of Kolhapur, instigated by Udaji Chavhan refused to listen to overtures made by Shahu and encamped on the north side of the Varna with all his baggage, women and equipments, and began to plunder the country. The Pratinidhi surprised Sambhaji's camp and drove them to Panhala with the loss of the whole of their baggage. Many prisoners were taken, among others Tarabai and her daughter-in-law Rajasbai the widow of Shivaji of Kolhapur. Both these persons were, placed in confinement in the fort of Satara (1730). This defeat brought on an immediate accommodation between the two brothers. Although Shahu was victorious he arranged a ceremonious meeting with his brother and conciliated him. Except some forts, the Maratha districts and claims in the tract of which the rivers Varna and Krshna to the north and the Tungbhadra to the south as the boundaries were wholly ceded to Sambhaji. Kopal near the Tungbhadra was relinquished by Shahu in exchange for Ratnagirl, and the territory of the Konkan, extending from Salshl to Ankola in North Kanara was given over to Sambhaji. In exchange for these places in the south Miraj, Tasganv, Athni, and several villages along the north bank of the Krshna and some fortified places in Bijapiir were given to Shahu. The fort of Vadganv occupied by Udaji Chavhan on the south bank of the Varna was destroyed. This treaty of Varna, (13-4-1731), as it is called was an offensive and defensive agreement between the two brothers and provided for the division of further conquests to the south of Tungbhadra which, on co-operation, were to be equally shared. Grants of inam land or hereditary rights conferred by either party within respective boundaries were confirmed.

Although enemies were not wanting to detract from the reputation of the Peshva and to extol that of his rivals, the success of the Pratinidhi did not materially affect the ascendancy which Bajirav had attained; but Nizam-ul-Mulk was still bent on opposing him and found a fit instrument for his purpose in Trimbakrav Dabhade. Ever since the Peshva had obtained the deeds from Sar Buland Khan, Dabhade had been negotiating with other Maratha chiefs and assembling troops in Gujarat. At length finding himself at the head of 35,000 men he had resolved to march for the Deccan in the next season.

Bajirav was well aware of the Senapati's enmitcy, but was not alarmed by his preparations until he discovered that Nizam-ul-Mulk was to support him in the Deccan. On learning their intention he at once determined to anticipate them, though, when joined by all his adherents, his whole army did not amount to more than half of that of Dabhade. Dabhade gave out that he was proceeding to protect the Raja's authority, and was supported by Pilaji Gaikvad, Kanthaji and Raghuji Kadam Bande, Udaji and Anandrav Pavar, Chimnaji Damodar and Kuvar Bahadur with many others. Bajirav proved that Dabhade Senapati was in alliance with Nizam-ul-Mulk and declared that he was leagued for the purpose of dividing the Maratha sovereignty with the Raja of Kolhapur, a measure inconsistent with sound policy and contrary to the divine ordinances of the Shastras.

The preparations of Nizam-ul-Mulk hastened the march of Bajirav, and as his army, though so inferior in number, was composed of the old paga horse or the Raja's house-hold troops and some of the best Maratha mankaris, he moved rapidly towards Gujarat. At the same time he began negotiating from the day he left Poona and continued until the hour of attack. In the battle which took place (1st April) between Baroda and Dabhoi in Gujarat, the death of Trimbakrav Dabhade the Senapati and many who commanded under him left complete victory to Bajirav with almost unquestioned leadership of the Maratha confederacy. A treaty was concluded in August and at the close of the monsoon the Peshva returned to Satara. He would have punished Nizam-ul-Mulk's treachery, but the Nizam warded off the blow which he could with difficulty have withstood by directing its aim against the head of the empire. Bajirav, readily agreed to the Nizam's views. It suited his favourite policy, and it gave employment to persons likely to disturb the domestic arrangements he aimed at establishing. Troops were immediately sent towards Malva under his brother Chimaji while he himself remained for a time engaged in the interior arrangements of government at Poona and Satara. Such appear to have been the rise and progress of the events and intrigues which ended in a secret compact between Bajirav and Nizam-ul-mulk which secured to Bajirav supremacy as Peshva and to the Nizam a kingdom in the Deccan.

The victory over Dabhade, like the issue of every civil war, left impressions on the minds of many not easily effaced. The Peshva adopted every means of conciliation in his power. He continued Dabhade's charitable practice called dakshina of patronising Shastris and Vaidiks according to their merit and feeding thousands of Brahmans for a few days at Poona. Yeshvantrav, the son of Trimbakrav Dabhade, was raised to the rank of Senapati, but being too young to take the management on himself, his mother Umabai became his guardian and Pilaji Gaikvad their former Mutalik or deputy was confirmed in that situation with the title of Sena Khas Khel or Captain of the Sovereign Tribe in addition to his hereditary title of Samsher Bahadur. An agreement was drawn up under the authority of Shahu and subscribed by the Peshva and Senapati, that neither party should enter the boundary of the other in Gujarat and Malva. Within the limits of Gujarat the Senapati was to have entire management, but he bound himself to pay one-half of the revenue to government through the Peshva. All contributions levied from countries not specified in the deeds given under the authority of Sar Buland Khan were to be made over to the Raja after deducting expenses [Grant Duff's Marathas, Vol. I, p. 378.].

Perceiving Bajirav's complete ascendancy, the appointment of the Hindu prince Abhaysingh to supersede Sar Buland Khan, the imbecility of the emperor, and the treachery as well as venality of his courtiers, and knowing also that he had rendered himself in the highest degree obnoxious, Nizam-ul-Mulk had good grounds for apprehending that the Peshva might be able to obtain the viceroyalty of the Deccan. The plan which under these circumstances he adopted belongs to the higher order of politics. It seems to have been framed for the purpose of diverting the Marathas from destroying the resources of his own country and of making his own power a balance between that of the emperor and the Peshva. Before invading Malva in person Bajirav had an interview with Nizam-ul-Mulk and endeavoured to induce him to advance a subsidy for the aid he was affording, but the Nizam considered the inducement sufficiently strong without paying his auxiliaries. The districts in Khandesh were to be protected by the present agreement of the Peshva in his passage to and from Malva and nothing more than the usual tribute was to be levied in the six subhas of the Deccan, a proposal to which Bajirav readily acceded. Bajirav on crossing the Narmada. assumed command of the army in Malva and sent his brother and Pilaji Jadhav back to Satara to maintain his influence at court and to concert measures for settling the Konkan which was very disturbed. In Gujarat Pilaji Gaikvad, who was assassinated by Abhaysingh's emissaries, was succeeded by Damaji (1732).

Kanhoji Bhonsle's disobedience and his consequent confinement at Satara, as well as Pratinidhis's sympathy for him have already been referred to above. Whether Nizam-ul-Mulk had made any preparations to take advantage of that situation is uncertain; but Chimaji Appa reasonably felt that Nizam meditated an attack. He therefore pitched his camp about forty miles east of Satara, leaving Pilaji Jadhav with an inconsiderable body of horse being the only troops at Satara in the immediate interests of the Peshva. When Bajirav advanced into Malva, it was his design to engage the Raja's mind with petty affairs in the Konkan. Divisions of authority, contending factions and the turbulent disposition of some of its inhabitants afforded ample field within the small tract from Goa to' Bombay for engaging and fatiguing attention. Savant, the principal deshmukh of Vadi occupied his hereditary territory in that quarter but having suffered from Kanhoji Angre's attacks before the late peace (1730) between the Rajas of Satara and Kolhapur he always bore an enmity to Angre's family. Kanhoji Angre's death happened in 1728, and all attempts to reduce his power before that time on the part of the English, the Portuguese, and the Dutch had failed. In the quarrels between his sons which followed Kanhoji's death, Bajirav helped Manaji and obtained from him the cession of Kotaligad in Thana and Rajmachi in Poona. The Sidi, besides defending against the Marathas, the districts which had been placed under his charge by Aurangazeb, including Mahad, Raygad, Dabhol and Anjanvel, frequently levied contributions from Shahu's districts. As force was not likely to prevail, the Pratinidhi, Jivaji Khanderav Chitnis, and others of the Raja's ministers formed schemes for ruining the Sidi by intrigue. For this purpose the Pratinidhi gained one Yakub Khan, a daring pirate who possessed the entire confidence of the Sidi. To aid this scheme, a force was sent into the Konkan in 1733 under the Pratinidhi, his chief agent Yamaji Shivdev, and, Udaji Chavhan. The intrigues were unsuccessful, and war ensued in which the Pratinidhi was worsted and the fort of Govalkot in Ratnagiri though strongly garrisoned was disgracefully surprised and taken. Chimaji Appa incurred the Raja's displeasure for not sending assistance to Shripatrav after repeated orders. Pilaji Jadhav was at length despatched, but as none of the other officers at Satara would undertake to support the Pratinidhi except on condition of receiving the conquered districts in jagir, he was compelled to return to Satara, with great loss of reputation. About this time the Sidi died and a quarrel ensued between his sons. Yakub Khan immediately embraced the cause of Sidi Rehman one of the sons and called on Shahu for support (1735); but nothing could be done until the return of Bajirav, who, after leaving Holkar and Shinde in Malva, returned to the Deccan, and on crossing the Godavari intimated to the Raja that he should march straight to Danda-Rajpuri. All the disposable infantry were directed to join the Peshva, and Pilaji Jadhav was sent off, reinforced with a body of horse, to support Malharrav Holkar in Malva. Sidi Rehman and Yakub Khan joined Bajirav who began operations by attacking some of the forts. Fattehsing Bhonsle and the Pratinidhi proceeded to co-operate, but the only help they gave was to recover Shivajis capital Raygad, the commandant of which had been previously corrupted by Yakub Khan. The Peshva reduced the forts of Ta]a and Ghosala and besieged Janjira but was obliged to listen to overtures made by the besieged, who ceded to the Marathas the forts of Raygad, Tala, Ghosala, Avchitgad, and Birvadi. After this successful close of hostilities, Bajirav, with additional power and influence, returned to Satara and was appointed Subheddr of the late acquisitions [Grant Duff's Marathas, Vol. I, p. 389.] . Holkar completely overran Malva and the country south of the Chambal and took possession of several places. Afterwards, on the persuasion of Kanthaji Kadam Bande, he made an incursion into Gujarat, and they both levied contributions as far as the Banas and plundered several towns to the north of Ahmedabad including Idar and Palanpur.

In 1736, Bajirav, owing to the vast army he had kept up to secure his conquests and to overcome his rivals, had become deeply involved in debt. His troops were in arrears; the bankers to whom he already owed a personal debt of many lakhs of rupees, refused to make further advances, and he complained bitterly of the constant mutinies and clamours in his camp which occasioned him much vexation and distress [Grant Duff's Marathas, Vol. I, p. 390. " I have fallen into that hell of being beset by creditors, and to pacify savkars and shiledars I am falling at their feet till I have rubbed the skin from my forehead." Thus wrote Bajirav to his mdhapurush, the Svami of Dhavadshi, a village within a few miles of Satara. The Svami was a much venerated person in the country. The Peshva's letters to the Svami detail the actions of his life in a familiar manner without disguise and are invaluable. Ditto, Vol. I, p. 387.] . Part of the distress originated in the high rates of interest which he was obliged to pay in order to outbid Nizam-ul-MuIk and secure the best of the Deccan soldiery. He levied the chauth and sardeshmukhi in Malva and applied through Raja Jaysingh for their formal cession in that province, and likewise for a confirmation of the deeds granted by Sar Buland Khan for Gujarat. The Turani Moghals who formed a considerable party in the ministry were decidedly against a compromise so disgraceful. With the object of achieving his purpose Bajirav started on a campaign towards the north. First, he wanted to estimate the attitude of the Rajputs and therefore proceeded through Malva and reached Udaipur in February, 1736. The Rana received him very. warmly and agreed to pay a lakh and a half annually as chauth. During his tour through Rajputana, presents and tributes poured upon Bajirav from all quarters. Khan Daman, the Mir Bakshi of the Moghals, who was usually guided by Jaysingh sent five to ten thousand rupees every day. On the 4th of March, Bajirav met Jaysingh who offered to pay five lakhs chauth annually for Jaipur and promised to obtain from the Emperor written giants for the provinces of Malva and Gujarat. Efforts were now made to arrange for Bajirav's personal meeting with the Emperor who however not caring to meet Bajirav in person at Delhi sent his own agent Yadgar Khan to Jaysingh with certain proposals tending to effect as advantageous a bargain as possible. Bajirav at once rejected the offer and communicated his counter proposals through his own agent Dhondo Govind. The Emperor was displeased at this and declined to reply. Bajirav knew that the Emperor could not be persuaded otherwise except by a trial of strength and he decided to take up the challenge. However as the season was far advanced he retired to the Deccan only to come back again early in January 1736 with all the contingents of Maratha Sardars gathering round his standard. As the advance party under Malharrav Holkar crossed Jamuna and got into the Dodb evidently for forage and plunder, they were suddenly attacked by the party of Vazir Sadat Khan and driven away. In the scuffle that ensued a number of Maratha soldiers were killed and those that were overtaken by the Moghals were slaughtered. The Vazir became so elated with this success that he wrote boastful letters to the Emperor informing him as to how Marathas had been signally defeated and driven away. When Bajirav heard of this he resolved to teach the Emperor a wholesome lesson by himself falling upon Delhi and burning its outlying parts. In two long marches he reached Delhi on 28th March but on a second thought desisted from any destructive operations. The presence of Bajirav at the gates of Delhi was enough to strike terror in the palace and there was a great commotion in the city. Thereupon Bajirav withdrew a little distance to Jhil Lake to allay the scare that had been created. A force of 8,000 soldiers despatched by the Emperor against him was completely defeated. No further trial of strength ever took place. Upon a promise of obtaining the government of Malva and Rs. 13 lakhs Bajirav set out on his return to Satara, where he paid his respects to the Raja and immediately proceeded into the Konkan to repulse an attack of the Portuguese on Manaji Ahgre (1737). The Peshva succeeded and took Manaji under his protection on condition of his paying a yearly sum of Rs. 7,000 and presenting annually to the Raja, foreign articles from Europe or Ghina to the value of Rs. 3,000 more. The war with the Portuguese led to the invasion of Salsette, and Bajirav, to secure his conquests in Thana and maintain the war against the Portuguese, entertained some Arabs and a very large body of infantry principally Mavlis and Hetkaries. News from Delhi obliged him to withdraw part of his forces from the Konkan.

In the meanwhile the Emperor sent earnest appeals to Nizam to come to Delhi for saving the situation and was granted all his demands to persuade him to take up the task of warding off the Maratha danger from the north. Nizam now went back upon his promise that he had given to Bajirav and proceeded to the North. In fact Bajirav had a shrewd suspicion of this development as the two met each other when Bajirav was going to the south and Nizam to the north apparently on a spacious plea of offering his submission to the Emperor. Bajirav therefore lost no time to proceed to the north again as soon as the rainy season was over. He assembled all the troops he could collect and by the time he reached the Narmada found himself at the head of 80,000 men, though Yeshvantrav Dabhade and Raghuji Bhonsle had not joined him (1738). Proceeding further Bajirav with his skillful manoeuvering operations was successful in confining Nizam in the fortress of Bhopal and prevent him from gathering supplies from outside. Finding himself in a tight corner Nizam at last sued for peace and on the 7th January 1738 signed a convention at Doraba Sarai, 64 miles north of Sironj, promising in his own handwriting to grant to Baj